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Don’t Look Down: Emotional Arousal Elevates Height Perception
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In a series of experiments, it was found that emotional arousal can influence height perception. In
Experiment 1, participants viewed either arousing or nonarousing images before estimating the height of
a 2-story balcony and the size of a target on the ground below the balcony. People who viewed arousing
images overestimated height and target size more than did those who viewed nonarousing images.
However, in Experiment 2, estimates of horizontal distances were not influenced by emotional arousal.
In Experiment 3, both valence and arousal cues were manipulated, and it was found that arousal, but not
valence, moderated height perception. In Experiment 4, participants either up-regulated or down-
regulated their emotional experience while viewing emotionally arousing images, and a control group
simply viewed the arousing images. Those participants who up-regulated their emotional experience
overestimated height more than did the control or down-regulated participants. In sum, emotional arousal
influences estimates of height, and this influence can be moderated by emotion regulation strategies.
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In an expedition in 1677, Father Louis Hennepin became the
first European explorer to document the existence of Niagara Falls.
Hennepin, viewing the falls from above, estimated the height of
the falls to be 600 feet, but the actual height is only 167 feet. It is
interesting that he also expressed a fear of the height: “The two
brinks of it are so prodigious high, that it would make one tremble
to look steadily upon the water” (Hennepin, 1678, ¶ 5). Did arousal
associated with a fear of the height influence his estimate of how
high the falls were?
Previous research on the perception of height suggests that
heights are overestimated more from the top than the bottom
(Jackson & Cormack, 2007; Sinai, Ooi, & He, 1998; Stefanucci &
Proffitt, in press). This overestimation occurs with a variety of
measures (e.g., verbal estimates of distance, matching the height to
a horizontal extent) and multiple locations, suggesting that this
overestimation is robust and reliable. However, the underlying
mechanism for this phenomenon remains unclear.
Overestimation of heights from the top is paradoxical given
current theories of distance perception. These theories suggest that
observers in reduced-cue situations (those in which common cues
used to scale distance are unavailable) should underestimate the
distance to a target (Gogel, 1965; Philbeck & Loomis, 1997).
Philbeck and Loomis (1997) reduced the availability of motion and
binocular cues to distance and found that participants in these
reduced-cue situations underestimated an extent with both verbal
and nonverbal reports of distance. Viewing a height from above is
also a reduced-cue situation because normal cues used to scale
distances are unavailable to observers when they are not standing
on the ground plane. For instance, the use of eye height, angular
elevation, or other secondary depth cues to determine distance is
compromised. Why, then, does standing at the top of a height
result in an overestimation of its extent rather than the predicted
underestimation?
One possibility is that greater overestimation of heights occurs
because of increased anxiety or fear experienced at the top of the
height compared with the bottom (Stefanucci & Proffitt, in press;
Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 2008). Father
Hennepin may have overestimated the height of Niagara Falls
because he was afraid. Recent work in clinical psychology sug-
gests that people with phobias may experience a different world
than nonphobics. Riskind, Williams, Gessner, Chrosniak, and
Cortina (2000) proposed
a global cognitive style involving a tendency to form biased expec-
tations about the temporal and spatial progression of potential threats.
The pernicious effects of the looming maladaptive style (LMS) can
lead individuals to mentally simulate active and dynamic scenarios
involving relatively mundane, nonthreatening situations. (p. 838)
Much of the work on LMS has been questionnaire based, but
Riskind, Moore, and Bowley (1995) asked participants to imagine
and draw the path that a spider in the room could take if let out of
its cage. The participants who were fearful estimated that the
spider would move more quickly and would follow a path toward
them rather than toward others in the room. Similarly, clinicians
have found that people with an extreme fear of heights often report
that bridges are higher and longer than they actually are (Rachman
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& Cuk, 1992). Results from studies that examined these anecdotal
patient claims in nonphobic populations are also promising. Ste-
fanucci and Proffitt (in press) found that nonphobic participants’
self-ratings of trait- and state-level fears of heights were positively
correlated with their estimates of balcony height. In addition,
Teachman et al. (2008) found that individuals with a severe fear of
heights estimated a balcony to be taller than did individuals with a
mild fear of heights.
A positive correlation between fear of heights and perceived
height suggests that fear may contribute to height overestimation
when viewing the height from the top. Fear includes many com-
ponents, such as changes in physiological state, cognitive process-
ing, and subjective distress (Barlow, 2002). Proffitt (2006) argued
that any of these components could alter the perception of a height
if the observer perceives an increase in the costs associated with
acting on or around the height (e.g., to minimize danger of falling).
As a result, the costs associated with being near the edge of a
height are manifested in an overestimation of the extent of the
height, and fear evokes a heightened awareness of the apparent
danger, which results in an additional increase in perceived height.
In this article, we test whether one of the components of fear,
arousal, is sufficient to alter perception. Arousal was tested in
isolation because there is ample evidence to suggest that arousal
could influence perceptions. Zillman (1971) argued that arousal
cues, which usually accompany a fear response, are generally
nonspecific and are easily transferred from one arousing source to
another. In addition, the emotional arousal associated with highly
arousing emotions, such as fear and excitement, has been found to
modulate attention and memory (Adolphs & Damasio, 2001;
McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006). These findings
suggest that emotional arousal can be nonspecific and, as a result,
may influence perception as well as attention and memory.
The notion that motivational or affective states can influence
perception has a long history. The New Look in Perception move-
ment, which started in the 1940s, tested whether factors like
motivation and value influenced the perception of size (Bruner &
Goodman, 1947; Bruner & Postman, 1947). Although the theoret-
ical approach to these studies was interesting, methodological
problems with the design and execution of the studies started great
debate and ultimately discredited the findings. However, the cur-
rent studies revisited the notion of the new look, in that we tested
whether arousal influenced the perception of another aspect of the
environment: heights.
When an observer is standing at a height, there are fewer cues
(as discussed above) to help in estimating the height than are
normally available when estimating ground extents. For example,
texture gradient, eye height, horizon information, and other sec-
ondary depth cues are unavailable when estimating a height.
Therefore, people may use nonvisual cues when evaluating or
estimating the extent of the height. We suggest that arousal is a cue
that people take into account when estimating a height. If people feel
aroused and are standing at a height, then the arousal may be
interpreted as being due to the height. This interpretation may be
more prevalent for people who have a fear of heights (and have
consistently experienced arousal as a symptom of their fear). In
addition, arousal may also play a role for people who are not as
afraid of heights, because a lack of informative cues about the
extent of the height necessitates the use of other information to
evaluate the height. In other words, if arousal is present when
people view a height, they may attribute the arousal to the height.
According to the arousal-as-importance approach (Storbeck &
Clore, 2008), feelings of arousal can serve to intensify evaluations
of the situation. In addition, feelings of arousal tend to be nonspe-
cific and can easily transfer from one source to another (Zillmann,
1971). Therefore, a critical assumption of the arousal-as-
importance approach is that feelings of an irrelevant source can be
misattributed and used to assess how one feels about the relevant
source being evaluated. Because higher heights are more danger-
ous, we believe an extra source of arousal should intensify the
dangerousness value assigned to the height. Therefore, when in-
dividuals assess their feelings while evaluating or judging the
height, the extra source of arousal should intensify their feelings of
how dangerous the height appears. And if individuals feel the
height is more dangerous, these feelings should lead to a subse-
quent overestimation of the height. Furthermore, this overestima-
tion of a height could lead to a cyclical pattern in which the
overestimation of the height serves to increase the arousal, which
then could influence future estimates, and so on.
Another possibility is that the arousal was used as information
about the height, but the overestimation was a result of reduced
attention as Easterbrook (1959) proposed. The arousal could be a
dominant cue that observers use to estimate the height, but given
that Easterbrook found that arousal can lead to less vigilance, the
overestimation of height may occur because of reduced attention to
the available cues to distance with which to construct the height
estimate. Fewer cues with which to estimate the height would
likely lead to a greater bias and thus a greater overestimation of
height.
Proffitt’s approach (the economy of action approach; see Prof-
fitt, 2006) claims that the perception of the environment is influ-
enced by the costs associated with intended actions in those
environments. The research presented here is certainly an instance
of perception affecting one’s interpretation of the world in such a
way that the likelihood of action near a height is reduced. Because
the costs associated with acting on the height are high, the per-
ceptual overestimation is adaptive and serves to protect the ob-
server. In addition, we believe that Proffitt would propose that fear
evokes a heightened awareness of the apparent danger and may
even evoke an additional increase in perceived height. Because
fear responses have many symptoms, including arousal, multiple
symptoms could increase perceptual estimates of height. The ques-
tion we address in this article is whether arousal, which is not
related to or caused by a fear reaction, can also increase height
estimates.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, we investigated whether induced emotional
arousal from a non-height-related source can influence height
perception. According to Proffitt’s (2006) approach, only arousal
caused by being at a height (e.g., on a balcony) should alter
perception of that height because it would provide information
about the costs or ability associated with acting on the height.
However, Zillmann’s (1971) theory of excitation would predict
that arousal from any source, whether height relevant or not, may
influence height perception. To evaluate these hypotheses, we
manipulated emotional arousal that was not relevant to the balcony
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used in our experiment by presenting arousing images to nonclini-
cal populations before participants estimated the balcony’s height.
Method
Participants
Thirty-five (26 female) undergraduates participated to fulfill a
course requirement. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Mean age was 18.64 years (SD  1.19), and 57%
reported race and/or ethnicity as Caucasian, 1% as African Amer-
ican, and 11% as Asian. One person did not report his or her race.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Arousal task. All pictures were chosen from Lang, Bradley,
and Cuthbert’s (1999) International Affective Picture System
(IAPS). Arousing IAPS pictures were chosen because they reliably
elicit emotional arousal (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang,
2001; Bradley & Lang, 2007). One hundred twenty images were
selected and divided into four groups of 30 pictures. Each partic-
ipant saw one set of pictures (the pictures in Groups A and B were
arousing, the pictures in Groups C and D were nonarousing). All
sets contained both positive and negative images, and 27% of the
arousing and 10% of the nonarousing pictures had a height-related
theme.1 Pictures were presented using PowerPoint. The means,
standard deviations, and analyses for the images can be found in
Table 1.
Perceptual task. Participants stood on a balcony that measured
8 m high (see Figure 1). A large blue disk made of core board (45.7
cm in diameter) marked the endpoint of the distance to be judged
on the ground beneath the balcony.
Anxiety questionnaires. Participants completed the Anxiety
subscale of the Acrophobia Questionnaire (AQ; D. Cohen, 1977)
to measure trait-level fear associated with heights after performing
the perceptual task. This scale measures the degree to which a
person has fear-relevant thoughts when thinking about a variety of
height environments.
In additional, a single item on height anxiety measured partic-
ipants’ state-level fear associated with the balcony used in this
experiment. Participants were asked the question after they had
completed the perceptual tasks, while they were still standing on
the balcony. The height anxiety question asked, “How anxious are
you as you look over the balcony?” Participants answered on a
scale from 0 (completely calm) to 100 (about to have a panic
attack). Finally, demographic information was obtained.
Recognition test. A recognition test of the pictures was given
after the perceptual measures. Participants were presented with a
picture and then asked to judge whether they had seen it during the
learning phase (old) or not (new). However, participants in both
groups (we collapsed across the two arousing groups, Groups A
and B, and the two nonarousing groups, Groups C and D, of
pictures) had very good recognition (92%), p  .56. For the
remaining experiments, the same memory cover story was used,
but we did not test recognition memory for the images; thus,
recognition performance will not be discussed further.2
Procedure
Participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to
test their memory for a series of pictures. To provide a break
between the learning and testing phases of the memory task, we
asked participants to complete a filler task (judging the height of a
balcony). The perceptual task was described as being completely
separate from the memory task.3 Participants were randomly as-
signed to either the arousing or the nonarousing (control) condi-
tion.
Arousal phase. Participants were shown one set of 30 pictures.
Each picture was presented for 3 s, with a brief delay between
pictures.
Perceptual estimation. Immediately after picture presentation,
participants were walked out to the balcony located near the
experimental room. All participants viewed the height from the top
and stood on the edge of the two-story balcony (with a 0.91-m-high
railing), with the target placed on the ground beneath where the
participants stood on the balcony. They indicated their estimate of
the height of the balcony by positioning an experimenter to be the
same distance from them along the balcony as the top of the railing
was to the target on the ground. The experimenter walked back-
ward while facing the participant and waited for the participant to
tell him or her to stop. Participants were encouraged to look back
to the target as often as they liked and to have the experimenter
adjust the distance between them until the participants were satis-
fied. After estimating the distance to the target, participants esti-
mated the size of the target. Participants were told to match the
target diameter to the length of a tape measure, which the exper-
imenter slowly pulled open (with the numbers facing away from
the participant, horizontally) until the participant said to stop.
This indirect measure was chosen because size is a converging
measure of perceived height given that apparent size is frequently
related to perceived distance (i.e., the size–distance invariance
hypothesis; Epstein, 1973). So, size estimates are dependent on
perceived distance (in this case, height), even though participants
were likely unaware of this relationship. If a participant saw the
1 Some of the pictures involved heights or height-related themes in both
the arousal and the control groups, but we were conservative in our
characterizations of the pictures. For example, a picture of a mountain from
afar was considered height related. However, we did find that the arousing
pictures were more often of someone “falling” from a first-person perspec-
tive, whereas the neutral pictures did not include this first-person perspec-
tive as much.
2 The lack of differences in the recognition test for this experiment is not
surprising given the mixed findings in the literature concerning arousal and
memory tested within a day of learning. Some studies show that arousing
information is better remembered after a short delay (Blake, Varnhagen, &
Parent, 2001; Nielson, Yee, & Erickson, 2005), but other studies often find
that emotionally arousing stimuli do not enhance memory and sometimes
can impair memory (Barros, Pereira, Medina, & Izquierdo, 2002; Bianchin,
Souza, Medina, & Izquierdo, 1999; Christianson, & Mjorndal, 1985; Dou-
gal & Rotello, 2007; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992; Ochsner, 2000; Revelle &
Loftus, 1992; Schafe & LeDoux, 2000; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004;
Walker, 1958). Furthermore, our participants were almost at ceiling for
their recognition of the pictures, which would make it harder to find an
effect of arousal. Other studies have found that recognition memory for
pictures is outstanding. In an older study by Standing, Conezio, and Haber
(1970), participants were presented with 2,560 pictures, and a two-
alternative forced-choice test showed that performance exceeded 90%
retention.
3 None of the 19 subjects questioned believed that the memory task
influenced their perception of the balcony height.
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height as taller, then they should estimate the target as larger. Also,
participants estimated both the balcony height and the target size
by matching the extent or diameter, which did not rely on memory.
State and trait anxiety. The height anxiety question was ad-
ministered while participants stood on the balcony to allow us to
examine state-level anxiety of heights. Then participants were
brought back into the lab, where they completed the subscale of the
AQ designed to examine trait-level fear of heights.
Testing phase. After completing the trait-level anxiety mea-
sure, participants completed the recognition task.
Results
The data from 4 participants (3 in the arousal condition, 1 in the
control condition) were not included because the target was re-
moved during the study by an individual unrelated to the experi-
ment. In addition, the data of 3 participants were removed from the
analysis because their height estimates were 2.5 standard devia-
tions above the mean, collapsing across the two sets of pictures, for
their respective conditions (1 in the arousal group and 2 in the
control group).
Perceptual Estimates
We found that emotionally arousing stimuli influenced height
perception, such that individuals who viewed arousing pictures
(M  13.60 m, SD  2.64) overestimated the height of the balcony
more than did the individuals who viewed nonarousing pictures
(M  11.40 m, SD  2.95), F(1, 27)  4.35, p  .05, p
2  .14
(see Figure 2). Participants in the arousal group (M  51.59 cm,
SD  10.70) also estimated the size of the target to be larger than
did participants in the control group (M  41.60 cm, SD  6.48),
F(1, 27)  9.21, p  .005, p
2  .26 (see Figure 3). The overes-
timation of size in the arousal group is important because it
suggests that indirect measures of distance are also influenced by
the arousal manipulation. Again, size is a converging measure of
perceived height given that apparent size is frequently related to
perceived distance. This relationship was present in the current
experiment: Participants in both groups who saw the height as
taller estimated the target to be larger. There was a positive
correlation between the height and size estimates for the control
group, r(15)  .59, p  .02, and the arousal group, r(13)  0.53,
p  .06.4 We also tested whether gender influenced the perceptual
estimates of size and height. The analyses revealed no effects of
gender on height, F(1, 24)  0.035, p  .85, or size, F(1, 24) 
0.65, p  .43, estimates and no Gender  Condition interactions,
both Fs  1.00, both ps  .35.5
Anxiety Measures
First, we examined whether individual differences in height-
related trait anxiety and height-related state anxiety correlated with
the perception of height. We found that scores on the AQ were
marginally positively correlated with the perceived height of the
balcony, r(25)  .37, p  .07. Individuals who had more trait
anxiety were more likely to perceive the balcony to be higher,
regardless of their arousal condition. There was also a nonsignif-
icant trend of a positive correlation between state anxiety and
perceived height, r(26)  .31, p  .11. This finding supported the
notion that when the specific environment in which the observer
was located was more anxiety provoking, the observer reported
4 We recognize that the sample size for these correlations by group may
be too small to be reliable (here and throughout). Our conclusions about
these correlations are therefore tentative.
5 We analyzed gender for all of the experiments, but the only experiment
that showed an effect of gender was Experiment 2 (on horizontal distance
perception, not height perception). Therefore, we reported those analyses in
Experiment 2 but do not report gender in any of the other experiments.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Slide Ratings
Condition
Valence Arousal Valence p value/Arousal p value
M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Experiments 1, 2, and 4
1. High arousal A 5.6 1.8 6.0 0.78 —
2. High arousal B 5.5 1.8 6.0 0.78 .74/.78 —
3. Low arousal C 5.6 1.3 3.5 0.78 .91/.01 .83/.01 —
4. Low arousal D 5.6 1.2 3.3 0.93 .94/.01 .80/.01 .97/.32 —
Experiment 3
5. Positive HA 7.0 0.65 6.1 0.71 —
6. Positive MA 7.3 0.52 4.2 0.74 .45/.01 —
7. Negative HA 3.8 0.95 6.2 0.65 .01/.97 .01/.01 —
8. Negative MA 3.4 0.82 4.4 0.70 .01/.01 .01/.54 .22/.01 —
9. Control 5.7 0.93 3.1 0.82 .01/.01 .01/.01 .01/.01 .01/.01 —
Note. Experiment 4 only used the highly arousing images. A, B, C, and D refer to the groups of photos viewed. HA  high arousal; MA  medium
arousal. The photos associated with the following International Affective Picture System image numbers were used in Experiments 1, 2, 3, or 4: 1030, 1040,
1051, 1120, 1220, 1240, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1321, 1540, 1590, 1600, 1603, 1604, 1610, 1930, 1931, 2040, 2070, 2100, 2110, 2372, 2383, 2800, 2900, 4599,
4601, 4606, 4608, 4653, 4660, 5000, 5001, 5010, 5030, 5201, 5220, 5470, 5500, 5510, 5621, 5628, 5629, 5660, 5700, 5731, 5750, 5800, 5900, 5950, 5970,
5982, 5991, 6230, 3250, 6260, 6300, 6510, 6570, 6900, 6910, 7000, 7004, 7009, 7010, 7025, 7030, 7034, 7035, 7040, 7050, 7080, 7090, 7095, 7096, 7100,
7130, 7140, 7150, 7175, 7186, 7187, 7190, 7205, 7207, 7211, 7224, 7237, 7238, 7490, 7500, 7545, 7560, 7595, 7640, 7705, 7820, 7830, 8021, 8030, 8031,
8040, 8041, 8080, 8160, 8161, 8180, 8185, 8200, 8250, 8260, 8300, 8340, 8350, 8370, 8400, 8470, 9622.
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greater feelings of anxiety (for a complete correlation matrix, see
Table 1 in the supplemental materials). Finally, there were no
effects of gender for state-level anxiety, F(1, 24)  0.97, p  .34,
or for trait-level anxiety, F(1, 24)  0.01, p  .92.
In addition to running the analysis of variance (ANOVA) pre-
sented above, we ran an analysis of covariance to examine whether
individuals’ trait anxiety (AQ scores) interacted with the arousal
manipulation. This analysis included height estimates as the de-
pendent measure, arousal group as the independent variable, and
AQ score as a covariate. The analysis revealed a marginal main
effect for arousal, F(1, 24)  3.55, p  .07, p
2  .14, and a
marginal main effect for AQ score, F(1, 24)  3.95, p  .06,
p
2  .16. However, the interaction between arousal and AQ score
was not significant, F(1, 24)  0.99, p  .33. The same analysis
was run for the size estimates. A main effect was observed for
arousal, F(1, 24)  5.46, p  .05, p
2  .2, but there were no main
effects for AQ score and no interaction. These findings suggest
that the influence of viewing arousing or nonarousing pictures on
height and size estimations were independent of the participants’
self-reported trait-level anxiety.
Discussion
Participants overestimated heights after viewing arousing im-
ages. Specifically, the group that viewed arousing images, com-
pared with the group that viewed nonarousing images, overesti-
Figure 1. View of the target on the ground from the balcony used in






















Figure 2. Participants who viewed arousing images overestimated the
height of the balcony more than did participants who viewed nonarousing
images. Bars represent 1 standard error and the horizontal line represents



















Figure 3. Participants who viewed arousing images overestimated the
size of the target more than did participants who viewed nonarousing
images. Bars represent 1 standard error and the horizontal line represents
the actual size of the target in centimeters.
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mated both the balcony height and the target size. As stated
previously, these overestimations were independent of the trait-
level anxiety of the observer. Therefore, the previously found
influences of fear on height perception (Stefanucci & Proffitt, in
press; Teachman et al., 2008) may be due to an increased level of
arousal experienced by fearful observers. Thus, we suggest that
arousal can influence lower level processes, such as perception, in
addition to the previously observed effects of arousal on higher
level cognitions like memory, attention, and decision making.
There are two concerns that we could not address with the
current experiment. First, were the overestimations observed due
to arousal per se? We believe that they were. The pictures were
selectively chosen to vary on the level of arousal they were to
invoke, and these pictures were effective in prior studies at elic-
iting an aroused emotional state, such as fear and excitement (Lang
et al., 1999; see also Bradley & Lang, 2007). Also, these pictures
were used in recently published studies as reliable elicitors of
arousal without self-reports of arousal serving as a manipulation
check (e.g., Phelps et al., 2006). Because we did not collect
ratings of self-report either, it remains unclear whether arousal
produced our effect, so we tried to address this issue in Exper-
iments 3 and 4.
Second, why did state anxiety not differ between the two
groups? We believe that participants may have discounted the
arousal induced from the pictures when reporting their fear of the
balcony height. These discounting effects are not uncommon. For
instance, in several studies, it was found that arousal intensified
evaluative judgments. However, the influence of arousal was only
observed when participants were asked to describe feelings about
the evaluated object but not when asked to evaluate the object
directly (Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001; Martin, Thomas, & Strack,
1992). Thus, when our participants were asked to report the
anxiety that they felt on the balcony, they may have discounted
their arousal from viewing the images. However, because their
feelings were not surveyed until after they estimated the height, the
induced arousal may have influenced those height reports. There is
also the possibility that the single item about state-level anxiety
experienced at the height was ineffective at measuring partici-
pants’ true level of arousal. Rather, the question may have been
construed by participants as pertaining to a fear response, and they
may not have interpreted their arousal as such.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that induced emotional
arousal unrelated to the balcony could have influenced the percep-
tion of height, lending support to expectations based on Zillman’s
(1971) rather than Proffitt’s (2006) approach. However, as a fur-
ther test of Proffitt’s approach, in this experiment, we examined
whether viewing arousing images could influence other percep-
tions of spatial layout, such as a horizontal distance. Specifically,
we were interested in finding out whether the effect observed in
Experiment 1 was specific to a parameter of spatial layout that
often increases arousal, like a height, or whether it would extend to
a nonarousing situation, like viewing a ground distance in a hall-
way. Previous research has shown that other nonoptical factors,
like the physiological potential of the observer, can influence the
perception of horizontal ground distances (Proffitt, Stefanucci,
Banton, & Epstein, 2003; Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). Observ-
ers who are wearing a heavy backpack or who have just thrown a
heavy ball perceive distances as being farther than do observers
who are not wearing a pack or who throw a light ball. Therefore,
arousal could alter the perception of distances on the ground as
well. This experiment was identical to Experiment 1, except indi-
viduals were asked to judge horizontal ground distances rather
than a vertical extent.
Method
Participants
Thirty-four (20 women; 3 participants did not report their gen-
der) undergraduates participated to fulfill a course requirement. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Mean age
was 19 years (SD  1.6), and 57% reported race and/or ethnicity
as Caucasian, 11% as African American, 17% as Asian, and 1% as
mixed. Three people did not report their race.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Arousal task. All pictures were the same as those used in
Experiment 1.
Perceptual task. Participants stood in a 35-m hallway and
judged three horizontal ground distances (6.3 m, 8.3 m, 10.3 m) to
a large blue disk made of core board (45.7 cm in diameter) that was
used in the previous height experiment. The disk was displayed
vertically (propped up by placing an object behind it) in the
hallway so that participants could see the full size of the object
from their viewing position.
Anxiety questionnaires. Only the trait-anxiety scale, the Anx-
iety subscale of the AQ, was administered.
Procedure. Participants were given the same memory cover
story as were participants in Experiment 1. Then, as a between-
participants manipulation, they were randomly assigned to see
either the arousing or the nonarousing images. The images were
presented in the same manner as they were in Experiment 1. After
all of the images were presented, participants were moved into the
hallway to begin the perceptual task, which was described as being
unrelated to the memory task.
Perceptual estimation. For the distance estimation task, par-
ticipants were asked to stand at the corner of an L-shaped hallway,
in which the target was placed in one arm of the L and the distance
estimate was given down the other arm of the hallway. They were
presented with one experimental distance (8.3 m) followed by two
distracter distances (6.3 and 10.3 m). For each trial, the participant
was asked to face the nontarget arm of the hallway with eyes
closed while the experimenter set up the target at the appropriate
distance. The experimenter walked back to the participants before
participants turned around and opened their eyes, so the partici-
pants did not get any information about how long it took the
experimenter to walk to the target. After the target was appropri-
ately placed and the experimenter had returned to the participant,
the participant was asked to turn around and to indicate his or her
judgment of the distance to the target on the ground by asking an
experimenter to move. The experimenter moved down the other
arm of the hallway until the participants judged the experimenter
to be the same distance to them as the target was to them (a
matching procedure similar to the one used in Experiment 1). They
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were encouraged to look back and forth as much as they liked and
to adjust the experimenter until he or she was as accurately placed
as possible. Between trials, participants were asked to turn away
and close their eyes while the target was set up at the next trial
distance. The same procedure was repeated for all distance esti-
mations.
After participants estimated all of the distances to the target, the
target was returned to the 8.3-m location and participants were
asked to estimate the size of the target as in Experiment 1, using
the tape measure for the size-matching task. On completing the
perceptual tasks, the participants returned to the experiment room
to complete the anxiety questionnaire.
Results
We found that the arousal manipulation did not influence the
perception of horizontal ground distances. A repeated-measures
ANOVA was run with distance (6.3 m, 8.3 m, and 10.3 m) as the
within-participants factor and arousal as the between-participants
factor. There was a significant effect of distance, F(2, 48) 
491.06, p  .0001, p
2  .95, but no significant effect for arousal
condition, p  .76. Participants reported greater distances to be
farther away (for the 6.3-m distance, M  6.21 m, SD  0.59; for
the 8.3-m distance, M  8.17 m, SD  0.64; for the 10.3-m
distance, M  10.2 m, SD  0.63), but arousal did not influence
their distance estimates. Finally, we ran a one-way ANOVA on the
size estimate of the target and found that there was no difference
in the estimate of the size on the basis of arousal level, F(1, 33) 
0.19, p  .67; see Table 2 for means and standard deviations.
There were no correlations between the trait anxiety scores and the
estimates of the 6.3-m, r(29)  .04, p  .82; 8.3-m, r(29)  .21,
p  .27; or 10.3-m, r(29)  .24, p  .20, distances or the size
estimate, r(29)  .28, p  .12.
Discussion
The results of this experiment suggest that emotional arousal
does not influence the perception of horizontal distances in the
same manner that it influences height perception and that viewing
the IAPS images does not elicit a general overestimation of all
parameters of the environment. We ran a power analysis to deter-
mine whether we had enough power to detect an effect for hori-
zontal distances if it was present. Specifically, we used the effect
size obtained from Experiment 1, d  0.50, with an alpha level of
.05 and found that we had 81% power to detect an effect in this
experiment (J. Cohen, 1988). Moreover, these null findings were
not surprising given that Proffitt’s (2006) approach suggests that
when no cost is associated with acting in the environment, arousal
should not influence perception. Thus, we tentatively suggest that
the environment must contain a cost for action if experienced
arousal, caused by a source unrelated to the perceptual environ-
ment, is to influence perception. However, we concede that more
research is needed to determine whether any horizontal distance
would be unaffected by manipulations of arousal. If participants
were asked to walk a gangplank or reach over a height, then an
arousal manipulation may change their perception of the extent of
the plank or reach.
We do not know of any prior research that has directly tested the
influence of arousal on distance perception. Instead, the research
that has been done has shown effects of higher level cognitive
processing, like motivations or cognitive dissonance, on distance
perception (Balcetis & Dunning, 2007). We believe that the im-
portant finding in the current experiment is that simply viewing
arousing pictures does not make every distance appear farther or
larger. This finding provides an important check for general re-
sponse biases that could follow the viewing of arousing images. If
participants intuited our hypothesis, then they would be likely to
estimate every parameter of the environment to be larger or farther.
Table 2








distance AQ Anxiety Self-arousal
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Experiment 2
HA 42.5 7.2 6.2 0.64 8.1 0.51 10.3 0.63 43.3 12.7
Low arousal 43.5 6.7 6.2 0.55 8.2 0.76 10.2 0.65 50.4 17.7
Experiment 3
Positive HA 54.0 13.1 48.6 19.3 10.8 10.5 3.4 1.2
Positive MA 51.1 9.9 51.6 22.7 6.9 12.4 3.1 1.3
Negative HA 52.7 9.4 63.4 19.6 37.9 28.6 3.7 1.5
Negative MA 48.9 10.7 51.7 21.6 12.3 20.6 4.0 1.4
Control 50.9 6.2 56.9 24.5 16.3 18.5 2.2 1.1
Experiment 4
Up-regulation 50.2 9.2 50.4 16.3 22.7 24.0
Down-regulation 50.3 12.0 44.2 14.7 22.5 25.0
Control 48.9 7.5 46.9 15.1 17.7 24.5
Note. HA  high arousal; MA  medium arousal; AQ  Anxiety subscale of the Acrophobia Questionnaire; Self-arousal  self-reported arousal after
viewing the images; Anxiety  self-reported anxiety level while looking over the balcony.
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This experiment shows that a general cognitive response bias was
probably not the reason for the effect observed in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 1 showed that viewing emotionally
arousing images influenced the perception of height, and the
results of Experiment 2 suggest that this influence may be specific
to heights. In this experiment, we tested whether the altered
perception of height in Experiment 1 was due specifically to
arousal or whether it could be moderated, in part, by valence.
Because imagining the costs associated with falling off of a height
would presumably be negative in valence, we hypothesized that
valence may contribute to an influence of arousal on height per-
ception. Also, testing multiple levels of arousal would begin to
reveal the shape of the function that relates arousal to height
perception. In the current experiment, we manipulated arousal
level (high, medium, or low) and valence (positive vs. negative) to
further describe the influence of emotion on height perception.
Method
Participants
Eighty-four (49 female) undergraduates participated to fulfill a
course requirement. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Mean age was 19 years (SD  1.3), and 63%
reported race and/or ethnicity as Caucasian, 11% as African Amer-
ican, 13% as Asian, 1% as Latino. Three people did not report their
race.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Arousal task. The picture viewing conditions, height percep-
tion task, and questionnaires used were identical to those used in
Experiment 1. However, participants also completed a question-
naire about their feelings regarding the images. Also, the pictures
in this experiment were changed so that they systematically dif-
fered in both valence and arousal (the pictures in previous exper-
iments also differed in valence and arousal, but valence was
matched across the conditions). Five conditions were selected:
positive valence, high arousal; positive valence, medium arousal;
negative valence, high arousal; negative valence, medium arousal;
and neutral valence, low arousal (control). In each group of pic-
tures, approximately 30% were height-related pictures, as in the
previous experiments (see Table 1 for slide means and statistical
comparisons of valence and arousal across groups). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the five picture conditions.
Arousal manipulation check. The manipulation check was ad-
ministered after the perceptual task. The participant was asked to
“describe how you were feeling while viewing the emotional
pictures.” They answered this question four times using 6-point
Likert-type scales, each with different endpoints. The first question
used a scale with 1 being not aroused and 6 being very aroused,
the second question used a scale ranging from very unhappy to
very happy, the scale for the third question ranged from very
unpleasant to very pleasant, and the scale for the last question
ranged from very negative to very positive.
Perceptual task. The perceptual task from Experiment 1 was
used.
Anxiety questionnaires. The same state and trait anxiety mea-
sures were administered as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1 except
that the recognition test was not given. Participants were told that
the purpose of the experiment was to test their memory for a series
of pictures. They were shown the pictures for the test and then
were led to the balcony, where they gave their perceptual estimates
and state-level rating of anxiety. Finally, they were brought back to
the lab to complete the AQ and to collect demographic data.
Results
The data of one participant were removed because the partici-
pant failed to follow instructions (from the negative valence, high
arousal condition). Another participant’s data were removed be-
cause the participant’s size estimate was 3 standard deviations
above the mean (from the positive valence, high arousal condi-
tion). The data of 4 individuals (2 from the negative valence, high
arousal condition; 2 from the control condition) were removed
because their height estimates were 3 standard deviations from the
mean.
To determine whether the arousal manipulation was effective,
we ran a one-way ANOVA on self-reported arousal and found a
significant main effect, F(4, 75)  3.95, p  .01, p
2  .18. Post
hoc analyses using Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD)
revealed that the positive high arousal and medium arousal ( p 
.01 and .06, respectively) and the negative high arousal and me-
dium arousal groups ( p  .003 and .001, respectively) all had
higher self-reported arousal in comparison to the control group.
In addition, a significant effect was found for self-reported
happiness after running a one-way ANOVA, F(4, 75)  28.87,
p  .001, p
2  .18. Post hoc analyses revealed that the positive
high and medium arousal groups, as well as the control groups,
were happier compared with the negative high and medium arousal
groups (all ps  .001). Self-reported arousal and self-reported
happiness were not correlated, r(76)  .15, p  .21 (see the
supplemental materials for all correlations and Table 2 for all
means and standard deviations).
A main effect was observed between the groups for height
estimates, F(4, 77)  3.22, p  .05, p
2  .15. Post hoc analyses
revealed that all groups differed from the control group. The high
(M  14.4, SD  1.85, p  .05) and medium (M  13.9, SD 
2.33, p  .01) arousal, negative valence groups and the high (M 
13.4, SD  2.51, p  .05) and medium (M  14.4, SD  3.40, p 
.01) arousal, positive valence groups all overestimated the balcony
height compared with the control (M  11.6, SD  1.02) group
(see Figure 4). No other differences among the groups were
observed. Differences in size estimation also failed to reach sig-
nificance, F(4, 77)  0.58, p  .68 (see Table 2 for means and
standard deviations). The findings suggest that both positive and
negative arousing images influence visually matched perceptions
of height.
It is interesting that after running a one-way ANOVA, we
observed a significant main effect for state anxiety while partici-
pants were on the balcony, F(4, 77)  6.35, p  .001, p
2  .26.
Post hoc analyses using Fisher’s LSD revealed that the negative
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valence, high arousal group had higher anxiety ratings compared
with all of the other groups (all ps  .01; see Table 2 for means
and standard deviations). All other effects were nonsignificant.
Overall, participants in the negative valence, high arousal group
reported higher levels of state anxiety while on the balcony.
Self-reported feelings of arousal were positively correlated with
height estimates, r(76)  .24, p  .05, such that individuals who
reported greater feelings of arousal while viewing the pictures
tended to overestimate height more. No other variables were
significantly related to height estimates. Reports of happiness were
significantly negatively correlated with reported state anxiety
while on the balcony, r(76)  .38, p  .001. Participants who
reported feeling happier after viewing the images also reported less
state-level anxiety while on the balcony. In addition, the trait-level
anxiety scale for heights (AQ) was significantly positively corre-
lated with both the size estimates, r(77)  .23, p  .05, and
state-level anxiety, r(77)  .48, p  .001.
Because self-reported arousal and self-reported happiness were
correlated with height estimates, we ran a multiple regression that
included both self-reported arousal and self-reported happiness.
The factors were simultaneously entered; the regression equation
with unstandardized coefficients was Y  12.286  0.436
(arousal)  0.02 (happiness). The findings showed that self-
reported arousal was a significant predictor for height estimates,
t(75)  2.09, p  .05,   .24, such that higher levels of arousal
predicted more overestimation of height. Self-reported happiness
did not predict height estimates, t(75)  0.09, p  .93,  
.10. The findings showed that self-reported arousal, but not
self-reported happiness, predicted overestimation of height esti-
mates.
Discussion
We believe the results of this study suggest that arousal, more
than valence, influences height perception. In sum, we observed
that both high and medium levels of arousal can influence height
perception, but valence manipulations do not have a similar effect
on height perception. Admittedly, the manipulations for the two
arousal conditions (high and medium, collapsing across valence)
were not effective. The two high arousal conditions did not differ
in arousal ratings from the two moderate arousal conditions. Fur-
ther research is needed to be able to assess the effects of different
levels of arousal on height perception. Or there may be a certain
arousal threshold that needs to be crossed and then any level of
arousal will influence perception. This would be an important issue
to address in future studies. However, our central purpose in this
study was to examine whether the influence of arousal observed in
this experiment and Experiment 1 was moderated, in part, by
valence. The findings suggest that the effect of arousal on height
perception is not mediated by the valence associated with the
arousal.
Experiment 4A
The results of Experiments 1 and 3 showed that viewing emo-
tionally arousing images influenced the perception of height. Ex-
periment 3 suggested that this effect may be due to the arousal
associated with the images rather than the valence. Therefore, in
this experiment, we tested whether encouraging observers to mod-
erate the level of emotional arousal they experienced while view-
ing the images would influence height perception. We manipulated
level of arousal by adopting a paradigm from the emotion regula-
tion literature (Ochsner et al., 2004) and applied it to the procedure
used in Experiment 1. Specifically, we predicted that by asking
participants to up-regulate their emotional experience while view-
ing emotionally arousing images, their subjective arousal would
increase and they would overestimate height more than would
other groups. However, if participants could lower the level of
subjective arousal by down-regulating their emotional experience
while viewing the pictures, they would overestimate height less
than would control participants.
Method
Participants
Forty-nine (23 female) undergraduates participated either to
fulfill a course requirement or for payment ($7). All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Mean age was 19 years
(SD  2.13) and 59% reported race and/or ethnicity as Caucasian,
14% as African American, 10% as Asian, 1% as Latino, and 1% as
other.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Arousal and emotion regulation task. Only the arousing image
sets from Experiment 1 were used in the current experiment. There
were three conditions: up-regulation, down-regulation, and con-
trol.
Participants were informed that the goal of the study was to
memorize the presented pictures. Each participant was then told
that he or she would receive specific instructions to help in
remembering the pictures. These instructions served as the regu-
lation manipulation and were adapted from Ochsner et al. (2004).
The up-regulation group was told to think that they or a loved one
Figure 4. Participants who viewed arousing images, regardless of their
valence, overestimated the height of the balcony more than did participants
who viewed nonarousing images. Bars represent 1 standard error and the
line represents the actual height of the balcony in meters.
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was the central person in the picture. The down-regulation group
was told to view the picture from a detached, third-person per-
spective. Ochsner et al. found that giving participants these in-
structions influenced subjective arousal in the appropriate way;
therefore, we anticipated that participants’ subjective arousal
would be increased in the up-regulation condition and decreased in
the down-regulation condition. The control group was simply told
to attend to the pictures and to try to remember them.
Perceptual task. The same perceptual task was used as in
Experiment 1.
Anxiety questionnaires. The same state and trait anxiety mea-
sures were administered as in Experiment 1. We also administered
an emotion regulation questionnaire that assessed how often indi-
viduals used either a reappraisal or a suppression strategy when
trying to regulate their emotions (Gross & John, 2003). The scale
assesses two factors or strategies typically used to regulate one’s
emotions. On the one hand, when participants reappraise to reduce
their emotional consequences and feelings, they cognitively miti-
gate or redefine their feelings to reduce their level of arousal (see
Gross, Richards, & John, 2006). On the other hand, suppression
involves inhibiting or avoiding the current emotional state rather
than trying to redefine it cognitively. It is often thought to be a
response-focused strategy that is invoked after emotion-related
responses have been triggered.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that used in Exper-
iment 1 with the exception of the memory instructions and the
removal of the nonarousing picture condition. Participants were
told to study and remember a series of pictures. The memory
instructions differed depending on the regulation condition (as
described above). Again, the perceptual task was presented as a
filler task that was completely separate from the memory task.6
Participants were randomly assigned to the up- or down-regulation
conditions or to the control condition. On completion of the
perceptual task, participants filled out the trait anxiety measure.
Results
The data of 4 individuals were removed from the analysis (1 in
the down-regulate condition and 3 in the control condition): In two
cases, there were accidentally two targets on the ground, and the
data of the other two were removed because harsh weather con-
ditions compromised their estimates.
Perceptual Estimates
The regulation instructions influenced the perceived height of
the balcony, F(2, 42)  3.91, p  .05, p
2  .16 (see Figure 5).
Post hoc comparisons using Fisher’s LSD showed that the up-
regulation group (M  15.2, SD  3.24) estimated the height to be
higher than did the down-regulation group (M  13.0, SD  2.13),
p  .05, and the control group (M  12.7, SD  2.45), p  .01.
The down-regulation group and the control group did not differ in
their height estimates, p  .71. There was no significant effect of
regulation instruction on the perception of the size of the target,
p  .91 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).
Correlational analyses were run to examine whether the height
and size estimates were correlated overall, regardless of group
membership. These measures were positively correlated, r(43) 
.35, p  .05. If participants perceived the height to be taller, then
they perceived the target to be larger.
Personality Measures
Neither the AQ nor any of the other anxiety measures were
correlated with the perceptual estimates in this experiment. How-
ever, significant correlations with the reappraisal questionnaire
were found. For the down-regulation condition, we observed a
significant positive correlation between the suppression factor of
the emotion regulation questionnaire and estimates of balcony
height, r(14)  .55, p  .05. The more likely individuals were to
use a suppression strategy, the higher they tended to perceive the
balcony height. For the control group, we observed a negative
correlation between the reappraisal factor of the regulation ques-
tionnaire and estimates of balcony height, r(14)  .64, p  .05.
Those who were more likely to engage in a reappraisal strategy
when viewing the images estimated the balcony to be shorter.
Finally, for the control group, we also observed a significant
negative correlation, r(14)  .64, p  .01, between reappraisal
and estimates of target size, such that those who were more likely
to use a reappraisal strategy were also more likely to estimate the
target to be smaller.
Discussion
Overall, we found that emotion regulation strategies can mod-
erate the overestimation of height. This is an important finding,
because it replicates the influence of arousal on height perception
6 The last 8 subjects were questioned about the nature of the experiment,
and none of them believed that the regulation instructions, pictures, and
height task were related. We were concerned about participants intuiting
our hypothesis, but we did not realize that they were not being asked about























Figure 5. Participants who up-regulate their arousal overestimated the
height of the balcony more than did participants who down-regulated or did
not regulate their arousal. Bars represent 1 standard error and the horizontal
line represents the actual height of the balcony in meters.
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but also shows that this effect can be moderated by different levels
of arousal, which would have implications for treatments of anx-
iety disorders. Furthermore, the results suggest that future studies
could more carefully map out the relationship between arousal and
height perception by examining how different levels of arousal
result in perceptual changes (maybe a threshold has to be crossed
to predict a change in perception, or perhaps a linear relationship
exists between arousal and height estimates).
Admittedly, the down-regulation of emotion did not produce
significantly lower estimates compared with the control condition.
However, this was not surprising because prior research found that
regulation is not always effective for reducing physiological re-
sponses in the time specified (see Gross, 2001). Moreover, brain
imaging studies using similar regulation strategies also found no
differences in brain activation patterns for emotion areas between
the control and down-regulation groups (see Urry et al., 2006).
Thus, it is possible that participants who were trying to down-
regulate their emotional reactions to the images were unsuccessful,
particularly given the positive correlation between emotion sup-
pression and height estimates. Individuals in the down-regulation
group who were more likely to suppress their emotional feelings
were also more likely to overestimate the height of the balcony.
These correlational findings suggest that the suppressed arousal
may still affect underlying processes outside of the awareness of
the participant (see Gross et al., 2006). Therefore, if participants in
the down-regulation group were suppressing their reactions, they
may have still used arousal to estimate height without experiencing
the physiological or cognitive reactions normally associated with
the arousal manipulation.
This suppression strategy may have been more prevalent in the
down-regulation group than the control group, in which partici-
pants may have reappraised their emotions (given the correlational
findings) more often. Unlike suppression, which involves inhibit-
ing or avoiding the current emotional state, reappraisal strategies
aim to mitigate emotional consequences by cognitively redefining
the situation to reduce the emotional consequences or experiences.
When participants reappraise during the emotional elicitation, they
often reduce their emotional experience and emotional feelings
(Gross et al., 2006). Participants in the down-regulation group
should have been reappraising given the instructions; however, our
correlational data suggest that they may have suppressed more
often. Control participants who reappraised, compared with other
participants, gave shorter estimates of the balcony and smaller
estimates for the target size.
Therefore, we were unsure as to whether participants were
effectively up- or down-regulating their arousal throughout the
task, which could have influenced the results in both conditions.
We ran a follow-up study to test for the effectiveness of the
regulation task.
Experiment 4B
The results of Experiment 4A showed that emotion regulation
strategies influenced the perception of height; however, only the
up-regulation instructions were influential. After obtaining the
results for Experiment 4A, we questioned whether the regulation
instructions had the intended effect on the participants’ arousal
levels across the conditions. Therefore, we conducted a follow-up
experiment with a new group of participants to examine whether
the regulation instructions influenced subjective arousal.
Method
Participants
Forty-three (34 female) undergraduates participated to fulfill a
course requirement. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The picture stimuli and memory task instructions were identical
to those used in Experiment 4A.
Arousal Manipulation Check
The manipulation check was the same as that used in Experi-
ment 3.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 4A, except
instead of completing the perceptual task, participants completed
the arousal manipulation check.
Results
A single outlier in the up-regulation condition was removed from
the analysis. The regulation instructions influenced the arousal that
participants experienced while viewing the images, F(2, 42)  5.54,
p  .01, p
2  .22. As expected, post hoc comparisons using
Fisher’s LSD showed that the up-regulation group (M  4.13,
SD  0.64) felt more aroused than did the down-regulation group,
(M  3.14, SD  0.86), p  .01, and the control group, (M  3.29,
SD  1.07), p  .05. The down-regulation group and the control
group did not differ in their experienced arousal, p  .67. The
regulation instructions also influenced the participants’ happiness
levels, F(2, 42)  4.85, p  .01, p
2  .20. Post hoc analyses using
Fisher’s LSD showed that the participants in the up-regulation
group (M  2.67, SD  1.23) reported feeling less happy than
those in the down-regulation (M  3.71, SD  0.83), p  .01, and
control groups, (M  3.64, SD  0.93), p  .05. The down-
regulation group and the control group did not differ in their
happiness ratings, p  .85.
Discussion
These results suggest that the manipulation in the previous
experiment may have been successful at increasing subjective
arousal for the up-regulation group compared with the control and
down-regulation groups but unsuccessful in lowering subjective
arousal for the down-regulation group compared with the control
group. If this was the case, then we would expect a difference in
the perceptual estimates for only the up-regulation group when




These studies suggest that emotional arousal, regardless of its
affective value and source, can influence height perception. In four
experiments, we showed that (a) overestimation of height results
from viewing emotionally arousing stimuli, (b) emotional arousal
may only influence height perception and not other parameters of
spatial layout, (c) the valence of the arousal does not seem to
further increase height overestimation, and (d) up-regulating sub-
jective arousal does increase height overestimation. The results of
Experiment 1 revealed that when participants viewed pictures of
emotionally arousing stimuli, they overestimated height, with both
direct (visual matching task) and indirect (size matching task)
measures of height, more than did participants who viewed non-
arousing images. Experiment 2 showed that the emotionally arous-
ing stimuli in Experiment 1 had little (if any) influence on the
perception of horizontal ground distances. Experiment 3 tested
whether the arousal manipulation used in Experiment 1 would
interact with valence. It is interesting that arousal, but not valence,
influenced height perception. Furthermore, self-reported levels of
arousal significantly predicted height overestimation, but self-
reported levels of happiness did not. In Experiment 4, we found
that height overestimation could be partially moderated by regu-
lating experienced feelings of arousal. Participants who up-
regulated their subjective arousal when viewing the images over-
estimated height more than did participants who viewed arousing
images with no regulation or with down-regulation strategies.
Overall, we found that one component of fear—arousal—was
sufficient to evoke a greater degree of height overestimation.
Previous research has found that arousal influenced nonrelated
task performance in other paradigms. For example, a seminal
article by Yerkes and Dodson (1908) showed that moderate levels
of arousal improved learning performance. Another classic study
found that men crossing a rickety bridge were more likely to call
a female experimenter for a date than were men who crossed a
stable bridge (Dutton & Aron, 1974). Dutton and Aron showed
that participants’ arousal from the experience on the bridge could
be misattributed as a reaction to the female experimenter to influ-
ence subsequent behavior. Finally, in a recent perception study,
participants who experienced emotional arousal from viewing
faces showing fear demonstrated increased contrast sensitivity, in
part because the arousal facilitated attention (Phelps et al., 2006).
In a similar way, the current study demonstrates that emotional
arousal can influence visual processes in other tasks.
We were somewhat surprised that arousal unrelated to heights
could produce overestimations of height perception. One reason
for our surprise comes from Proffitt’s (2006) predictions that only
height-specific arousal should influence perceived height because
it would make the observer overestimate the threatening nature of
the environment, whereas arousal related to other sources might
not. However, we did find that our manipulation of emotional
arousal did not influence the perception of horizontal ground
distances, lending partial support to Proffitt’s suggestion. The
effect of arousal on overestimations of height is consistent, how-
ever, with Zillmann’s (1971) theory of excitation transfer. He
argued that emotional states that elicit arousal symptoms do so in
a nonspecific manner, permitting the integration of arousal cues of
one stimulus with another. In the current study, the arousal asso-
ciated with the pictures may have been integrated with arousal
cues associated with the height of the balcony, resulting in an
overestimation of the height. In addition, when arousal was in-
creased by the up-regulation of experienced arousal in Experiment
4A, we observed a further increase in the perception of height.
However, a similar influence was not present when we examined
estimates of ground distances in a hallway. The environment in
which observers are located is crucial in determining whether they
will incorporate arousal into perceptual estimates or not. We do not
claim that horizontal distance would always be immune to the
effects of arousal. A horizontal distance across a bridge, for
example, might be very different in this regard from the distance
down a hallway.
The evidence from our studies suggests that when the observer
is in a potentially dangerous environment (e.g., on a balcony),
arousal cues not relevant to the environment may then be misat-
tributed to the dangerous environment. But when the environment
has little danger or no cost associated with it (as in a hallway),
arousal cues not relevant to the safe environment are less likely to
be attributed to objects in a way that would influence perception.
This explanation is consistent with Proffitt’s (2006) approach and
also to the affect-as-information approach first proposed by
Schwarz and Clore (1983; see also Clore et al., 2001; Schwarz &
Clore, 2007). The affect-as-information approach explains how
feelings guide judgments and cognitive processes. In this view,
many judgments and decisions are made as though people ask
themselves, “How do I feel about it?” This process can influence
implicit as well as explicit judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In
addition, whereas the valence dimension of affect conveys infor-
mation about value, the arousal dimension is believed to convey
information about urgency (Clore & Storbeck, 2006). Moreover,
feelings of arousal that are not related to the object of the judgment
can often be misattributed to that object so that they influence
judgments relevant to urgency, as in the case of fear. Thus, we
believe that the feelings from the arousing pictures combine with
feelings elicited by the height of the balcony to create a greater
sense of urgency or anxiety on the balcony. This enhanced expe-
rience of arousal should then result in overestimations of height. It
is important to note that from this approach, arousal should not be
attributed to the hallway distance because the hallway has no fear
potential, and thus the manipulated arousal state is discounted prior
to perceptual estimates.
Perception or Bias?
The discussion of the affect-as-information approach leads to an
important question about whether arousal influences early percep-
tual or later cognitive processes. In other words, does arousal
influence how participants saw the height or just how high they
judged it to be? Throughout this article, we have claimed that our
effects are perceptual, but we cannot know whether arousal influ-
ences perception or judgment when responses involve cognitive
processes. The size measure was used, in part, to provide an
indirect measure of height. An effect on such an indirect measure
would provide important evidence that the effects of arousal were
on perceptual experience rather than on perceptual judgments.
However, we did not obtain consistency between the direct
estimate of height (visual matching task) and the indirect estimate
of height (size matching task) across all of our studies. In Exper-
iment 1, both the height of the balcony and the size of the target
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were overestimated more in the arousal condition than the nonar-
oused condition. In Experiments 3 and 4, arousal manipulations
influenced only the visual matching measure and not the size
estimates. Moreover, estimates of the size of the target were only
sometimes correlated with the height estimates. The question of
whether arousal influenced perception or judgment is still open.
More evidence is needed to pinpoint the location of our effects.
However, the effect of arousal on height estimates was shown to be
a robust phenomenon, given that it appeared in three different
studies.
Alternative Explanations:
Attention and Perceptual Rescaling?
One alternative explanation is that we moderated an attentional
process that could feed back to and modify perceptual processes.
Many researchers have found that emotional stimuli can capture
attention and bias processing (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Öhman,
2005; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Vuilleumier & Schwartz,
2001). If emotional stimuli are superior at capturing attention, then
it is likely that these attentional biases could influence perception.
Arousal has also been shown to alter the scope of attention (East-
erbrook, 1959), which could have resulted in the overestimation of
height observed in the present studies. In the famous “weapon
focus” studies conducted by Loftus (1979), witnesses to a crime
were more likely to remember the gun than details about the
criminal holding the gun. In addition, Loftus, Loftus, and Messo
(1987) found that when participants viewed a slide with an image
depicting an emotional event, their eye movements were consistent
with those produced when a narrowing of attention occurs. Other
evidence also suggests that attention is narrowed to focus on
threat-relevant information for individuals who experience anxiety
disorders or depression (Mathews, 2006). Moreover, recent evi-
dence from Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008) found that highly
arousing positive emotions can also narrow the breadth of atten-
tion, which could help to explain the lack of difference between
positive and negative arousal groups in Experiment 3. Thus, it
could be that the participants in the arousing condition as com-
pared with the participants in the neutral condition attended to
different sources of information or cues in the environment, which
then led to different estimations of the height.
Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has also shown that
attention modulates the activity of cells in the visual cortex (for a
review, see Kastner, 2004). Pessoa and colleagues demonstrated
that emotional faces draw attention and, as a result, are found
faster in a display when presented with other nonemotional stimuli
(Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, & Ungerleider, 2006). Moreover, rock
climbers who experienced more anxiety while climbing were less
likely to detect irrelevant flashes of light during a climbing task
(Pijpers, Oudejans, Bakker, & Beek, 2006). These findings are in
line with recent suggestions of Duncan and Barrett (2007), in
which they propose that arousal states tend to amplify aspects of
the environment that reach visual awareness. This proposal is
consistent with prior theories of arousal and attention in suggesting
that arousal can serve to narrow the focus of attention and, con-
sequently, enhance the perception of attended objects. Thus, there
is solid evidence to suggest that emotional arousal can influence
attention and consequently guide visual perception to focus on
arousing elements in the environment.
Another possibility is that arousal changed the focus of attention
such that high arousal led to a quicker detection of the aversive
stimulus (the height) or that the height itself was held in attention
for a different amount of time across arousal conditions. Research
has shown that arousing stimuli can be processed outside of
conscious awareness and focal attention (Christianson, 1992) and
that when arousing stimuli are the focus of attention, it may take
longer to disengage from them (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton,
2001). Because attention could be a moderating factor in the
effects observed here, assessments of attentional differences in
future studies would be both interesting and useful.
The question still remains as to how arousal moderated percep-
tion. We proposed one mechanism, attention, but further work is
needed to test whether attention was truly a moderating factor. We
now propose a second possible mechanism by which arousal could
influence height perception. The arousal could have been inter-
preted (implicitly or explicitly) as information about the danger-
ousness of the height, which altered participants’ estimates of the
height’s extent. In other words, the visual system may have used
the bodily cues and sensations associated with the arousal to scale
the height. Traditionally, perceptual psychologists have argued
that the information available for estimating extents consisted of
visual angles and oculomotor cues only, which are scaled to a
unitless metric (Foley, 1980; Loomis, Da Silva, Philbeck, & Fuku-
sima, 1996). For example, the same unit that scales the size of a
room also scales the size of a shoe. In the case of the present
studies, we argue that information from arousal was used to
determine the metric by which extents would be estimated and
scaled. If participants were aroused, their perceptual ruler or units
were enlarged, which resulted in an increase in their perception of
height. This argument for a rescaling of perceptual units in accord
with the bodily state of the observer is relatively new but supported
by other studies that examined the influence of body size and
intention to act on reaching and distance perception in near space
(Linkenauger, Witt, Stefanucci, Bakdash, & Proffitt, in press; Witt,
Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005).
Conclusions
Emotional arousal has been shown to influence attention, mem-
ory, judgment, decision making, and other high-level cognitive
functions. Here, we show that the influence of emotional arousal
may extend to lower level perceptual judgments when the arousal
is relevant to the environment being evaluated (a dangerous height
rather than a nondangerous distance). This influence can be mod-
erated by regulating the level of arousal and may also be related to
the valence of the arousal. These studies are the first to show an
influence of arousal on lower level processes, such as perception.
They have implications for both emotion researchers and percep-
tual psychologists, as well as clinicians who may be treating
height-related phobias or anxieties.
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